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THE DIPLOMATIC LEAD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND LOCAL ACTORS’ VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING TERMS 
OF A SOCIAL POSITION 
 
David Ambrosetti  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Inspired by interactionist and constructivist sociology, this paper focuses on the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) as an arena with its own social rules and bureaucratic routines. It presents 
the informal position that UNSC diplomats delegate to specific members of the UNSC, the 
position of “leader,” when dealing with specific dossiers. Indeed, a change occurred during 
the 1990s and the early 2000s in how UNSC diplomats considered the task of leading a UN 
peace operation, notably in regards to the use of offensive military. The analysis of this 
change is documented with empirical material concerning the French leading position in the 
African Great Lakes region, from Rwanda in 1993 to DRC in 2003. A second instance of 
diplomatic leadership considered is the leading role assumed by the British authorities in 
Sierra Leone (1991-2002). The new “leadership” role calls upon UN diplomatic leaders to 
better protect the credibility of “their” peace operations. It sheds a light on the importance of 
deterring or incentive messages embedded in routine UNSC decisions, and how routine 
practices may change when facing critical situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire after the November 2010 elections held under the auspices 
of the UN brought some commentators to point out the leading role played by France in the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) and Opération Licorne on the ground, whether with suspicion 
or appreciation.i  When it appeared that former president Laurent Gbagbo was contesting the 
elections, the UNSC and the international forces there (blue helmets and French troops) opted 
for a firm military response. This event can be analyzed from various standpoints. In this 
paper, we examined a change that has occurred during the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s on how the UNSC diplomats have considered the task of leading a UN peace operation 
and on the use of offensive military means to support peace operations. In terms of France 
assuming a leading position in a French-speaking African country, the UN mission deployed 
in Côte-d’Ivoire was not novel.ii Yet, this practice was not business as usual in 2010. The 
French learned from their experience in the African Great Lakes region, from 1990 to 2000. 
Between the DRC and Côte-d’Ivoire, the notion of the diplomatic leading position in the 
UNSC changed. 
France was the UNSC member with the strongest bilateral involvement in the 
Rwandan armed conflict between 1990-1994, which included the rapid deployment of troops 
(opération ‘Noroît’) and military trainers (Détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction 
‘Panda’).  As armed confrontation and ethnic-oriented political violence escalated in Rwanda, 
the UN launched a peace operation (mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda, MINUAR) in 
1993. France was the informal leader of the UNSC in Rwanda. Such external involvement 
could not prevent the internal military and political dynamics from falling into three months 
of genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, preceded by a “politicide” against Hutu politicians, 
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journalists and activists rejecting the radical ethno-nationalist anti-Tutsi Hutu Power ideology. 
The genocide claimed some 800,000 lives. This experience eventually affected the position 
the French delegation held within the UNSC concerning armed conflict management in 
French-speaking Africa. Despite the subsequent armed conflicts that devastated the African 
Great Lakes region (Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi), French military and 
diplomacy went through a nine-year retreat after Opération Turquoise had deployed in the 
summer of 1994 in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire. This retreat came to an end with a cautious 
diplomatic return to the DRC in 2001/2002, followed by a new military operation, the French-
led European Union operation, Artémis, in the spring of 2003. 
The French diplomatic leading position vis á vis French-speaking Africa, first 
assumed, then lost, then recovered, provides us with a view of the everyday work of UNSC 
members; and with an analytical prism for interpreting the evolution of UN peacekeeping 
operations.iii The interest of the issue for African security is unquestionable. Whether in 1994 
or 2012, the UN has been a central actor in conflict resolution in Africa. Since the beginning 
of the 2000s, it has reached an unprecedented level of activity in peacekeeping operations,iv 
particularly in Africa: in 2009, an average of sixty percent of UN Security Council’s 
deliberations addressed African issues and seventy percent of the UN blued helmets were 
deployed in Africa.v  
UN peace operations have long been under scrutiny by social scientists and 
international relations scholars (IR).vi These studies frequently question the curtailed and 
challenging implementation of the UNSC resolutions in the field; they look for answers in UN 
organizational features,vii or in local actors’ political and military strategies.viii We adopt a 
different perspective  inspired by interactionist sociology.  In this approach, the focus shifts to 
the UNSC as a situated arena of repeated interaction between fifteen diplomatic delegations 
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(and UN secretariat’s officers and other guests invited to speak at the UNSC table).  We track 
specific positions held by UN diplomats in this arena of interaction. This approach allows us 
to trace the informal, bureaucratic position of actors in specific cases as a collectively 
acknowledged and sanctioned position attached to specific social rules and collective 
expectations among UNSC diplomats.  The result is a new intersubjective norm. 
The role of leader in the UNSC has witnessed two changes. The first is how UNSC 
diplomats have conceived of the relations they should keep with local belligerents who carry 
out violence. The second is the conditions under which UNSC diplomats should themselves 
resort to military solutions or actions. We use the term of normative change in this regard, 
pointing to different collective expectations of what is appropriate, what should be done 
We look at the changing French diplomatic leading role concerning the Rwandan 
conflict, and the consequences of this case for international conflict management on the 
conflict in Zaire/DRC begun in 1996. A second case of peacekeeping, the Sierra Leonean 
conflict from 1991 to 2002 under British leadership, confirms the change in the leadership 
norm in the UNSC for international peacekeeping. The potential political significance of the 
informal position of the UNSC diplomatic leader was first revealed during observations by the 
author’s stay within the UNSC alongside the French delegation in 2002. 
The paper has six sections. First, we address the theoretical and methodological 
implications of this research for constructivist IR theory. Second, we outline what we mean 
by the “leadership” role and how it has traditionally been framed at the UNSC.  We then 
explore three different situations that affect diplomatic leadership at the UNSC and their 
relation with local belligerents and violence. The first situation occurs when protective 
bilateral relationships exist between a UNSC member state and a country in turmoil prior to a 
UNSC involvement. We look then at how these relationships evolve when brought into the 
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UNSC diplomatic arena. Fourth, we look at a second situation, when peace operations are 
under way. We highlight the deterring or incentive nature of the messages that the UNSC 
sends to the local belligerents through its routine decision-making. Fifth, we look at the third 
case where UN peacekeeping operations face critical situation on the ground with high 
international media coverage. Finally, we claim that such critical moments in Rwanda in 1994 
and in Sierra Leone in 2000 have reflected a normative change concerning the way UNSC 
members have conceived of and assessed the leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations 
since the early 2000s. 
As mentioned above, these three situations and the normative change presented in the 
paper result from the analysis of two instances of diplomatic leadership and their effects on 
local actors. First, the Rwandan conflict (1990-1994); and second, the Sierra Leonean conflict 
(1991-2002). DRC (ex Zaire) is only of interest as a follow-up to the multilateral diplomatic 
process that started in 1993 for the Rwandan conflict. 
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES AND ROLES: AN INTERACTIONIST 
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
This research has two theoretical and methodological implications. The first is to focus on the 
UNSC as a particular arena of interaction, with its own social rules, norms and routines, 
enacted and reproduced by inter-individual everyday interactions. The second concerns the 
empirical importance of one informal leading position that UNSC diplomats collectively 
delegate to the leading actor when dealing with specific dossiers. When this position exists – 
which is not necessarily always the case (according to different degrees of “delegation”) – it is 
a rather technical, bureaucratic role that is poorly institutionalized. This informality can cast 
doubt on its political significance. In the sequences studied below, however, the role of the 
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leadership position provides us with insights into diplomatic dynamics inherent in the 
UNSC’s work. 
What can be learned from the study of situated political interactions within the UN 
Security Council? Can we find more than a succession of tactical moves from rational, goal-
oriented diplomats serving member states’ foreign policies? The answer lies in what IR theory 
terms as constructivist ontology: interactions within the UNSC take part in the social 
construction of international political reality. They reproduce and (re-)mould social 
institutions, rules and norms.  The norms represent shared ideas and mental categories,ix 
whereby actors define their practices towards others, define their interests, and even define the 
identities and roles they acknowledge of one another.x Constructivist and critical approaches 
have challenged the neorealist mainstream on international politics and security studies.xi  
They have inspired a great number of studies dealing with international security, interventions 
and peacekeeping operations. Two main trends, however, within this literature do not 
correspond to what I intend to do with the present research. 
First, constructivism and critical IR theory have often been mobilized in large debates 
about current liberal interventionism as a whole.  Some applaud the apparently unstoppable 
diffusion of ideas of humanity and human solidarity among international politics practitioners 
worldwide,xii as well as and the victory of Western supposed liberal political preferences.xiii 
Others have warned against processes aimed at “securitizing” control over “human surplus” to 
the benefit of the global capitalist system,xiv or against the edification of a quasi-imperial 
international system that deprives intervening states any political strategy to the benefit of 
international bureaucracies and transnational NGOs.xv Such broad debates exceed the scope of 
the present study. 
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The second difference is methodological. Although grounded in the same ontological 
assumptions as interactionist sociology, IR constructivist accounts of international 
intervention and peacekeeping often turn into macro-sociological analyses or macro-histories 
of ideas, rather than an examination of concrete interactions between clearly identified 
individuals.xvi They apply the mechanisms unveiled by interactionist sociologists (from the 
Chicago school notably) to the states as if they are “individual” actors, similar to the unitary 
state actor assumption that informs much of realist IR theory.xvii  The reified state is 
socialized, while seeking prestige or at least peer acknowledgement. This is supposed to 
explain how states happen to share similar norms, how they construct their own identities,xviii 
and how they strengthen or weaken their own self-esteem and “ontological security”.xix 
Rather than the anthropomorphized state, we prioritize inter-individual interactions 
and their effects.xx We argue that processes of identity and role formation, norms diffusion, 
etc. do not necessarily occur within a state at once, but rather occur within specific groups, 
and spread across states through inter-individual interactions.  In this sense, international 
politics is also constituted by arenas of situated interaction. Inter-individual interactions need 
to be examined through in-depth direct observation to ascertain regularities or changes in the 
reality they co-constitute on a day-to-day basis.xxi In what follows, we intend to circumscribe 
the fractions of international political reality that are specifically constructed within the 
UNSC among the diplomatic delegations in the course of their everyday interactions.  This 
does not mean that the UNSC is an island, isolated from larger international political 
dynamics. We do claim, however, that the interactions of UNSC members must be understood 
on their own merits.xxii 
As a result, the present study supports the recent “practical turn” in the social 
sciences,xxiii and notably in IR and security studies.xxiv Admittedly, massive ethnographic 
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observations on its members’ practices do not apply very well to the UNSC, due to the 
existing barriers that limit access to them. But when the opportunity to overcome these 
barriers and to observe the day-to-day UNSC work arises, some specific “logics of practice” 
become evident. The leader, as an informal but precise social position within the UNSC, 
opens a window into how the interaction among individuals is a specific context shapes 
norms. 
THE UNSC DIPLOMATIC LEADER IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
In the summer of 2002 the author had the opportunity for a ten-week internship period within 
the UNSC alongside the French delegation; and was in charge of some of the African issues 
then discussed at the UNSC table (Sierra Leone, DRC, Bissau-Guinea, and Somalia). As this 
participatory observation period was rather short, the detection of some specific social 
positions assigned to, or claimed by, UN diplomats, was prioritized. Such roles could then 
support further theoretical and empirical research. 
 Individuals hold various identities (belongings to multiple well-defined groups) and 
social positions (or roles) among these groups. Such identities and roles are necessarily 
attached to normative prescriptions, that is, to collective expectations that are socially 
positively sanctioned. Each failure to meet these expectations may generate some doubt 
within the group concerning the ability of the current holder of the role: it can lead to the loss 
of this position.xxv   Such processes remain difficult to grasp, though, since social positions 
(and the collective expectations attached to them) are not systematically formalized (textually, 
legally, or bureaucratically), nor necessarily formulated with words. They often remain 
informal, embedded in implicit knowledge, or what Giddens called the “practical 
consciousness” of the practitioners.xxvi 
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Within the 2002 UNSC, it is the role played by the British concerning the Leonean 
case that brought the author to investigate this particular role of “leader” in the UNSC. 
Through this position, one or several delegations are informally granted a driving position in 
the negotiation and decision-making process concerning a particular issue, and at a particular 
moment (leaders can change). 
The term “lead” is actually directly taken from the indigenous diplomatic lexicon in 
the UN; it was often discussed among colleagues dealing with the Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo dossiers (“on DRC, we [the French delegation] had the 
lead,”xxvii “the UK had the lead on Sierra Leone,”). More sociological evidence was gathered 
by observing the daily social division of multilateral labor and the particular roles and tasks 
assumed by these leading delegations prior to any consultation with Sierra Leone or the DRC. 
The precise moment when the delegations were speaking during private consultations and 
public meetings, and the kind of arguments and concerns they broached, were not accidental. 
There was a pervasive form of influence at stake in the course of the interaction and in the 
achievement of preliminary tasks that were collectively expected. 
Experts who keep a close eye on international conflict resolution and peacekeeping 
operations often mention this leading position. In some cases, single dossiers of conflicts are 
at stake.xxviii Others mention diplomatic leading positions referring to specific thematic issues, 
cutting across different conflicts and regions, such as Canada’s leading position on Human 
Security in the UN during the late 1990s, or the United Kingdom’s on the Kimberley process 
for controlling “blood” diamonds. Still others stress how the existence of an active diplomatic 
leading role within a multilateral arena bodes well for the efficiency of the actions to be 
adopted.xxix 
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Authors working on multilateral negotiations (commercial ones, for instance) show a 
great familiarity with this position and the entrepreneurial conception it connotes,xxx notably 
on the formation of coalitions,xxxi or on the importance of individual leaders in foreign 
policy.xxxii This obviously differs from an IR perspective on global leadership, such as that 
about American power,xxxiii or about hegemonic order and the global political economy.xxxiv 
Leadership in the present case study concerns a diplomatic delegation, that is, a limited 
number of persons in a delimited arena of regular interaction, about limited issues. 
First, the members of the Council often expect a deeper involvement in a dossier of 
conflict when a leading delegation has previously advocated for it and has overcome 
reluctances among its peers on the Council to put the new dossier on the agenda (this is a non-
written rule among UNSC members). They also usually expect leadership from any UNSC 
member liaised to the state in turmoil (such as a former colonizing power still active in the 
region, a regional political ally, etc.). 
The leadership position presupposes practices such as a special monitoring of the 
situation, the drafting of resolutions or presidential statements (at the very least), the constant 
negotiation with UNSC delegations (particularly the main financial contributors to the UN 
peace operations budget), discussions with the Secretariat services (when discussing 
operational options and available means or the appointment of UN representatives and senior 
staff in the field), and working with troop contributing states. No official prerogative stems 
from this informal position. Yet, the member assuming the leadership position should inspire 
some confidence among its colleagues when suggesting a line of action. In the consultation 
room, the leading delegation usually speaks immediately after the President. Equally, it is the 
first to congratulate its partners when a decision is reached and announced during public 
sessions. 
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This position does not amount by itself to a politically dominant position, which would 
inspire competition among UNSC members. It is a purely bureaucratic informal role. In many 
instances, such as when dealing with the most peripheral conflicts (in the Africa of the 1990s), 
leading positions were finally held by default and under the friendly pressure of permanent 
members. In other cases, permanent members were involved from the very beginning (France 
for Rwanda from February 1993 to the start of the genocide on April 6, 1994, and for Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 2000s); they sometimes share this position with close partners to the UN (such 
as the U.S. with the U.K. and Norway concerning Southern Sudan in the 2000s).xxxv 
If a delegation has successfully petitioned the UNSC to act in a country facing a 
security threat (for its political stability and/or for the stability of the region), the delegation 
will want to preserve its influence at the UNSC. The leading delegation will likely have 
already demonstrated familiarity with the dossier, the type of challenges involved, as well as a 
demonstrated ability to be heard locally, to have some local levers of action, while not 
alienating the Council from local actors. In turn, the leading delegation will harness new 
multilateral resources from the UNSC: material (human, military), organizational, legal 
(mandates), and symbolic ones (international legitimacy). This might help reduce the 
domestic pressure on this country regarding the financial burden and the politically expensive 
military operations associated with peacekeeping. But multilateralization should not appear to 
change strategic preferences or to engender a loss of control of the local political game. 
The objective of preserving diplomatic influence in the UN may intersect with the 
prospect of impacting local events and local political hierarchies. At least three different 
situations deserve attention, in order to properly appreciate the relation between how a 
diplomatic delegation is liaised with the political-military forces of the conflict locally 
(outside the UNSC) and how it will behave as a leader at the table of the Council. Starting 
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with the situation in 1990-1994 Rwanda, we first examine the impact of a pre-existing 
protective relationship, between a UNSC member state, in this case France, and its partner, 
the Rwandan regime before July 1994. 
MOBILIZING THE UNSC IN SITUATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING PROTECTIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL REGIMES 
In this section, we scrutinize the process whereby UNSC members ask the Council to address 
particular topics. As mentioned above, there is often one sole delegation that plays a decisive 
role in forcing a particular issue onto the UNSC agenda. For this delegation’s colleagues, such 
efforts reveal some interest and some pretension to sway the course of the UNSC future 
actions toward this situation. This is particularly the case when close relations already exist 
between the two states, like in privileged “zones d’influence” that are well acknowledged 
among UNSC members. The cases we study in this paper stress different kinds of relations 
between such pre-existing zones of influence and UNSC’s mobilization of a dossier. 
Rwanda 1990-1994 
The notion of a zone of influence describes the UNSC’s involvement (March 1993) in the 
armed conflict in Rwanda between the (Northerner Hutu-led) regime of Juvénal Habyarimana 
and the (exiled Tutsi-led) rebellion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993, the French 
delegation asked for a UNSC intervention in a country whose regime’s ties with the French 
Presidency were well known.xxxvi The “patron and client” relationship is often used to 
describe this kind of relationship, which is aimed at exchanging military and political 
protection (from the patron) with diplomatic, commercial, and other geopolitical advantages 
(from the client). France and postcolonial Francophone Africa is a good fit for this concept, 
although other external powers were also involved.xxxvii These ties were all the more obvious 
when President François Mitterrand’s advisors for military and African affairs almost 
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immediately assented to president Habyarimana’s request for help in October 1990; 
Opération Noroît mobilized up to six hundred soldiers and military advisers.xxxviii 
After more than two years of bilateral military involvement without any durable 
improvement, the Élysée palace asked its UN delegation to advocate for the Rwanda dossier 
within the UNSC. A UN peacekeeping operation was an acceptable solution, as long as it 
could stop the rebellion’s progress and foster a political agreement that would not marginalize 
the Habyarimana regime to the benefit of its enemies.xxxix 
Sierra Leone 1991-2002 
A zone of influence by a member of the UNSC does not always translate to an UNSC 
involvement. Following military assaults against its army by the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) (composed with elements of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the rebel 
movement that was led by Charles Taylor against Samuel Doe’s regime in Liberia), in April 
1991 the Sierra Leon regime of Joseph Momoh alerted the UNSC. The U.S. and the U.K. 
delegations were then considered the most interested ones, because of their historical, 
economic and diplomatic ties with, respectively, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They would, 
however, only deal with the Liberian issue at the UNSC table in 1993, sidelining the Sierra 
Leonean case for a long time.xl 
One element counted in the UNSC ability to remain uninvolved in Sierra Leone. In the 
wake of Charles Taylor’s invasion of Liberia on Christmas Eve 1989, a military force had 
been deployed; ECOWAS (the Economic Community of the West African states) agreed to 
launch the ECOMOG military operation, mainly Nigerian forces that were friendly to Doe’s 
regime. This (limited) patronage benefited from a post-Cold War context where regional 
organizations were encouraged by the U.S. and its close Western partners to respond to 
threats and to act as “subcontracting” security providers. This did not provoke too much 
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trouble among other UNSC members. Within the UNSC, the U.S. and the U.K. convinced 
ECOWAS to expand its operation, as the Liberian conflict was spilling over into Sierra 
Leone. They also provided the ECOMOG with (limited) bilaterally material support.xli 
ECOMOG, however, found it hard to deal with the RUF and particularly with the 
political instability and military coups in Freetown (in 1992, then in 1997). Sierra Leone 
gained stronger coverage and diplomatic visibility because of its deepening instability and 
violence. This was particularly the case when indiscriminate violence originated from the 
Nigerian troops themselves. Indeed, ECOMOG engaged in combat in Freetown after the May 
1997 coup that was fomented by mutineers from the Sierra Leone army who had allied with 
the RUF. The U.S. and U.K. delegations in the UNSC were progressively brought in to more 
firmly handle the dossier and get more involved in the day-to-day mediation process. 
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DAY-TO-DAY MESSAGES TO THE LOCAL ARMED GROUPS AS UN 
OPERATIONS ARE UNDER WAY 
Local military-political leaders keep a close eye on international interventions and their 
outcomes, be they directly concerned by the intervention (and linked in one way or another to 
the international interveners), or totally external to it. In the latter case, they were eager to vet 
what is internationally acceptable and possible. Diplomatic and military leaders cannot ignore 
the importance of the messages they collectively send to these armed groups through their 
interventionist practices.xlii Yet, in their everyday work, with its own routine and selective 
urgencies, they do not always spend the same energy deciphering what precise messages they 
are sending, to whom, and with what consequences. 
UNSC Indifference and Genocidal Politics in Rwanda: The Handcuffed French 
“Leader” 
The profound indifference reigning in the UNSC regarding Rwanda encouraged the French 
ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, to bring the French presidency's views of the 
conflict to the UNSC table.xliii President Habyarimana was perceived as trustworthy by the 
international aid community.xliv And the French delegation was the most influential delegation 
within the UNSC on Francophone African matters.xlv But this influential position also resulted 
from the support and levers France got from African actors. In 1993, the French delegation 
was cautious in gaining the support of the states of the region: Rwanda and Uganda (despite 
president Museveni’s links with the Rwandan rebellion) were officially asking for a UN peace 
operation. The main inhibitor to the French delegation was the concern of the U.S. Congress 
for runaway UN peacekeeping budgets.xlvi France used its military support for the U.S. led 
UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations in Somalia in 1992-93 to gain support. Apart from the 
U.S. concern, the French demand provoked no collective surprise or negative reactions. 
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The UNSC, as a whole, tended to interpret the escalation of political violence 
exclusively in terms of power-sharing arrangements among belligerents. French-led efforts to 
exert pressure on the Rwandan “parti unique” (the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour 
le développement, MRND) for a multiparty system (1992) and for peace negotiations with the 
RPF in Arusha (Tanzania) were, therefore, normal practices. Even in the evolving zero sum 
situation where violence and mass murders from Hutu-Power extremists against Tutsi 
civilians was evident, France promoted power sharing.xlvii 
The UNSC continued to defend the Arusha agreement (August 4, 1993), hoping that 
the current marginalization of the Habyarimana clan would hasten an internal, peaceful 
political transition.  It thus underplayed the increasing violations of the agreement, the 
worrying signals about the preparation for mass murders, and the climate of general political 
violence against civilians.xlviii Rwanda was even elected as a new member of the UNSC in 
January 1994, to encourage it to carry on with the transition. This could not happen without 
electoral support from the Francophone states among the group of the African states in the 
General Assembly. It also required the preliminary support of the UNSC members. 
The message the UNSC sent was a sort of “the situation can go on this way; it does not 
really worry us so far.” It, however, indifferently applied to the moderate politicians as well as 
to the extremist forces in the MRND and the Coalition pour la défense de la République 
extremist party (CDR) that were working at spoiling the transition and were prepared for mass 
slaughter. The UNSC had sent poor deterrent messages to the Rwandan, Hutu-led political 
parties and their own extremist forces. 
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UNSC Irresolution in Sierra Leone 
Unlike the French authorities in Rwanda, the U.S. and the U.K. kept a prudent distance from 
the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean dossiers; partly because there were no firm patron-client 
relationships between these governments. As well, immediate action from outside Africa was 
not needed because of ECOMOG. The modest multilateral (UNSC) management of the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean dossiers, nonetheless, supposed increasing relations with local 
actors. Apparently, although collectively acknowledged as the most influential delegations 
locally, the U.S. and U.K. delegations could not afford – or they had no interest – to liaise 
deeper with local actors in such a post-Cold War (and post-Mogadishu) African context. In 
accordance with the International Monetary Fund,xlix they prioritized general elections in both 
countries before any deeper UN involvement. In the 1997 elections in Liberia, U.S.-backed 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf lost. In Sierra Leone, Western- and Nigeria-backed Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah (a former UNDP officer supporter of the SLPP party) won the 1996 presidential 
election, partly thanks to the international pressure on the former junta, notwithstanding the 
existing defiance between Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean military leadership.l  
Constant hesitations, however, affected the UNSC action. The instability among the 
army boded ill for a resolute UN deployment, as the governmental partner facing the RUF 
rebels could implode at any moment. As well, any UN action would have to placate the 
ECOWAS and the Nigerian-led force deployed since 1990 in the Mano River region. 
Subsequently, painful military reactions were assumed by the ECOMOG, first after the May 
1997 coup, then after the RUF launched a new offensive towards Freetown in December 1998 
– January 1999. According to Paul Richards, in order not to be political marginalized, while 
hiding in the forests at the end of December 1993, the RUF increased atrocities in the wake of 
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military defeats.  It amplified this strategy as international actors were advocating for general 
elections in 1996 (leading to the infamous campaigns of amputations).li 
The RUF thus won a seat at the table of negotiations for a peace deal under the UN 
auspices. The Lomé Agreement (July 7, 1999) intended to turn the RUF into a respected 
ruling partner in an extended interim government. One would be mistaken to think that the 
U.S. and the U.K. delegations did not fully assess this message and its possible perverse 
effects. But the Lomé agreement resulted from two constraints: first, the difficulty ECOMOG 
had managing the situation militarily, while open to the scrutiny of the UNSC and its 
concerns for the loss of civilian lives; and second, the absence of an offensive instrument for 
the UN secretariat, preventing it from launching a more robust operation in the middle run 
alongside the chosen local partner, President Kabbah. Once the peace deal was signed, 
nevertheless, the U.K. delegation took a more resolute lead on the UN mission (UNAMSIL). 
It carefully sidelined the ECOWAS-Nigerian leadership and worked at isolating and 
marginalizing the RUF combatants in UNAMSIL. This resulted in the May 2000 crisis.  
As we will now see, the 1990 failures in UN peacekeeping operations made the UNSC 
members progressively acquiesce to a modified model of diplomatic leadership in UN peace 
operations at the beginning of the 2000s. This model praised the capacity of the leading 
delegation to rescue diplomatically and even militarily “its” UN peace operation, when visibly 
threatened, in order to protect UN credibility. 
“LEADERSHIP” IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS: DIPLOMATIC FAILURE IN 
RWANDA AND SUCCESS IN SIERRA LEONE 
When a UN peacekeeping operation faces a situation collectively judged as “critical”, one 
needs to envisage simultaneously the kind of relationships previously established between 
specific UNSC delegations and local actors, the forms of the UN involvement in the lead-up 
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to the crisis, and the role assumed by these UNSC delegations. The practical lessons regarding 
the crisis’ outcomes for them and for the UN as a whole also deserve attention. 
In Rwanda, the armed conflict never was a critical concern for UNSC members. The 
French Presidency and the military assumed what they routinely deemed a stabilizing role 
(regime protection and military training provided to new recruited “soldiers,” among them 
some future militiamen and génocidaires), and a mediation role in the short run. Along with a 
climate of indifference and self-censorship by the UNSC, this prevented the French from 
impeding the genocide. 
The French diplomats within the UNSC made two decisive mistakes concerning 
Rwanda. On the one hand, because of the previous involvement of some French military 
officers on the ground alongside the Rwandan army loyal to Habyarimana, French diplomats 
in New York felt the political sensitivity of Rwanda in Paris and thus did not act proactively 
to block the path to genocide. On the other hand, they depended too much on a hypothetical 
fall-back position, which was a rapid reaction from the UNSC members in case this “French” 
dossier went severely wrong. As we know, despite a hundred-day genocide that devastated the 
country and claimed more than 10,000 lives per day during the first weeks under the nose of a 
ill-equipped UN peacekeeping mission deployed in the country, a rapid deployment never 
came. 
The UN failure in Rwanda has been extensively studied. In part, it had to do with 
Africa losing its strategic value for most of the Western diplomats in the UN;lii  and with the 
U.S. - UN military defeat in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, just two days before the UNSC 
authorization for a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (MINUAR). Kofi Annan, then Deputy 
Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping operations, carefully relayed Madeleine 
Albright’s messages: the UN had to avoid new images of U.S. financed UN blue helmets 
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engaged in costly military defeats in conflicts deprived of any strategic interest, if it were to 
preserve the (indispensable) support of the U.S. Congress (30% of the whole peace operations 
budget at that time). If the UN could not marshal the material, logistical and doctrinal means 
to succeed on the field, or at least to avoid a media-covered and humiliating defeat, it would 
better not to act at all and remain out of sight on the ground.liii This is what the Secretariat 
obtained from the UN mission in Rwanda, without any reaction in the UNSC during the first 
weeks of the genocide. 
With the U.S. and UN withdrawals from Somalia and the shameful UN inaction in the 
heart of the Rwandan genocide, worrying messages were sent by the UN to entrepreneurs of 
violence: If they want to kick out the international forces so to carry on violent projects, they 
should target directly and in the most visible manner these forces, and particularly Western 
personnel, as Mohammed Farah Aideed’s men did in Somalia in June and October 1993. 
Indeed, intervening states in these peripheral conflicts rarely shared the kind of high-valued 
interests that drive their massive and durable military actions in other parts of the world, 
whatever the human costs are (Vietnam, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). In Rwanda, the 
day after President Habyarimana’s assassination on April 6, 1994, the Garde présidentielle 
rallied Colonel Théoneste Bagosora’s plan for the constitution of a new government faithful 
to the Hutu-Power extremist ideology and killed in the cruelest manner the moderate Prime 
Minister (Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and ten of the Belgian blue helmets who were protecting 
her. Because the UN Secretariat opposed any firm Belgian military response to the killers, the 
latter chose to quit the MINUAR, depriving the UN force of its offensive backbone.liv 
According to military that were in the field at the time, there was no doubt that a perverse 
lesson had been carried over from the UN failure in Mogadishu.lv 
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The American delegation had sought to avoid humiliation and pushed the UN to more 
carefully select where it should intervene and when it should withdraw. This was applied to 
Rwanda. As the President had been killed and the fighting had resumed, the UNSC, and in 
particular the delegation that asked to involve the UNSC in this situation, had to recognize 
their impotence and quit (as the U.S. did in Somalia in March 1994), despite the diffusion of 
the genocide, rather than keep on with their mission which would plunge the UN deeper into 
an inextricable situation. Importantly enough, in the U.S. delegations’ eye, such withdraw 
would also teach signing parties of peace agreements that they could not rely on a UN support 
and presence unless they were willing to comply with what they had agreed upon.lvi 
Obviously, such a “lesson” did not work in a context of genocide.   
The UNSC member states, however, particularly the leading one, could harness by 
themselves the required means for intervening, with chances of success, in order to restore 
minimal conditions for resuming UN peace activities.lvii This is precisely what occurred in 
Sierra Leone after the May 2000 crisis. At this time, around 500 UNAMSIL personnel were 
abducted by discontented RUF commanders in different parts of Sierra Leone. Whereas the 
U.S. immediately advocated for a withdrawal, Tony Blair’s government chose to come to the 
rescue of “his” UN mission under siege and to avoid a new fiasco. Indeed, the U.K. 
delegation progressively had become involved as an active leader of this mission beginning in 
1999.lviii It thus demonstrated to the other UNSC members that an intrusive and robust 
intervention, first from national forces and then UN peacekeepers under its diplomatic lead, 
might provide stabilization. 
Indeed, conditions were particularly favorable. Means were made available from 
London, from the Guinean army, then from the U.S. and the international donors. And the 
challenges to overcome were relatively low: a small territory, and a relatively weak rebel 
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group with increasingly exhausted combatants.lix The Sierra Leone regime had benefited from 
foreign support, notably the U.K.-led reform of the security sector provided by the 
British/International Military Assistance Training Team. It simultaneously remained under 
international scrutiny in order to ensure that the UNSC-supported action would not indirectly 
favor particularly violent or destabilizing political practices or strategies from President 
Kabbah and his regime. 
In the UN, the U.K. leading role in 2000-2002 was reflected in various indications, 
such as the intense diplomatic statements from the U.K. delegation concerning Sierra Leone, 
the key persons appointed to the UNAMSIL leadership (the Nigerian ambassador Oluyemi 
Adeniji as the chief of the mission and the British Alan Doss as his main deputy and UNDP 
resident coordinator), or the UNSC public meeting organized by British ambassador Jeremy 
Greenstock, then chairing the Council, on July 18, 2002, which was dedicated to the Mano 
River region’s crises.lx 
We claim below that this British success in Sierra Leone reflects a normative change 
concerning how UNSC members have collectively conceived of the leadership role in 
peacekeeping operations since the early 2000s. 
“LEADERSHIP” AND NORMATIVE CHANGE: PROTECTING UN MISSIONS 
FROM INTERNATIONAL DISCREDIT 
Some of the U.S. preferences in the heart of critical moments in UN operations, such as the 
Rwandan genocide, or the May 2000 crisis for the UNAMSIL finally inspired operational 
recommendations in the 2000 Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping operations.lxi 
But they are rarely presented sociologically as a change occurring first in the informal social 
rules supporting the position of diplomatic leader to the UNSC. Indeed, the intersubjective 
understanding of the role of the leader had changed. 
23 
 
 
 
The belated, UN-endorsed French Operation Turquoise (22 June–22 August 1994) 
reflects, after six weeks of inaction (and the decision to withdraw almost all the MINUAR 
contingents on April 21), an understanding of this new model of leadership. It inspired much 
sarcasm and criticism regarding previous French action and inaction. Some challenged the 
French as an impartial and locally respected protection of civilians.  
During the UNSC public meeting on May 16, 1994 (which finished late at night), the 
Ambassador of New-Zeeland, Colin Keating – who had previously chaired the April 21 
UNSC meeting when resolution 912 (that shamefully reduced the MINUAR staff) had been 
adopted, pronounced unusually severe words against the Rwandan regime. He thus indirectly 
contested the UNSC choices to which he and his colleagues had previously agreed.lxii  In the 
same evening, the Czech Ambassador, Karel Kovanda, recalled his previous statement (made 
on May 8) that genocide was going on in Rwanda. He thus openly disregarded the taboo 
previously promoted by the U.S. delegation against the use of the “g-word.” 
The debates about a UN mandate for Turquoise engendered many criticisms and 
suspicions from the delegations of Brazil, China, New-Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan.lxiii  The 
operation only won a UNSC mandate thanks to firm U.S. support. This did not prevent the 
UNSC members from doubting the French authorities’ ability to keep a grip on the local 
actors, as their previous local partners were out of power and Paul Kagamé, the coming 
Rwandan president, proved himself the master of security (and insecurity) issues in the 
region.lxiv 
To accurately measure the consequences of the French Rwandan experience in the 
medium term, one needs to observe the course of the diplomatic interaction within the UNSC 
during another crisis, partly linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide: the so called “refugee 
crisis” in the autumn of 1996 and the rebellion that toppled President Joseph Mobutu Sese 
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Seko in May 1997.  In August 1996, Mobutu’s imploding regime faced an armed uprising in 
the eastern provinces contiguous to Rwanda. Political tensions were high in South and North 
Kivu among different populations over land rights and citizen rights. The influx of tens of 
thousands of Hutu Rwandan refugees after the genocide in Rwanda into camps around Goma 
and Bukavu exacerbated the situation. These tensions turned into a more organized rebellion 
when the Rwanda and Uganda supported Alliance des forces démocratiques de liberation 
(AFDL) attacked the Hutu refugee camps in Zaire (DRC). Rwanda and Uganda sought to 
overthrow the then sick president Mobutu and to remove the threat of Hutu armed groups 
(notably composed of former génocidaires and their families) settled next door.lxv 
Zaire in 1996 revealed one fact: the genocide in Rwanda (which will be progressively 
interpreted as one of the most shameful, costly failures for the UN, in terms of image and 
credibility) lost the French delegation its previously routine leading position concerning the 
Great Lakes and Francophone Africa at the UNSC table. It made it easy-to-grasp arguments 
against the French call for immediate action in Zaire/DRC. Thwarted by this experience, the 
French military leadership itself categorically opposed any bilateral military intervention, in 
the Great Lakes region.lxvi 
The crisis in Zaire was also an opportunity to weigh the consequences of a reluctant 
diplomatic leader, in this case the U.S., when no UN operation was already deployed. For 
domestic and diplomatic reasons, the U.S. diplomats to the UN worked at avoiding any UN 
military response in the region, and manifestly preferred to lean on local military strongmen 
(Ugandan Yoweri Museveni and Rwandan Paul Kagamé), then considered as “New African 
Leaders,” to install domestic and regional political order.lxvii 
The U.S. delegation also helped to marginalize the French delegation by championing 
another potential leading delegation concerning the military operation to come, the Human 
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Security-advocate, Canada. UNSC members (including the French) supported the project of a 
Canadian-led multilateral military operation aimed at protecting the refugees and civilians in 
Eastern Zaire.lxviii This operation (named Assurance) was finally abandoned.lxix Yet, thousands 
of Hutu Rwandan refugees who had refused to go back home were killed by the Rwanda army 
and the AFDL rebels. Rwanda could then take partial control of mineral resources in the 
region.lxx 
The French military came back to the region in spring 2003, with operation Artémis 
(limited to the city of Bunia, Ituri); but this time under the auspices of the European Union. A 
few months before, the French delegation (led by Ambassador Jean-David Levitte) had 
renewed their collectively-acknowledged leading role to the UNSC on this very dossier. The 
role was exerted very prudently and in close cooperation with the Americans and the British.  
Artémis reflected the European Policy for Security and Defense policy of more 
aggressively intervening overseas.lxxi  It also affirmed the responsibility of the leading UNSC 
delegation to gather the political will and the military means for coercive action. In this case, 
instability and visible large-scale violence against civilians was spreading in Bunia and the 
region, and the MONUC (the UN Mission in DRC) first appeared incapable of stopping it. 
The violence occurred immediately after international actors and the UN had negotiated the 
withdrawal of the Ugandan military forces previously occupying Bunia. This violence thus 
directly challenged the UN. Undoubtedly, things are complex in the huge territory of the DRC 
and the regional war that spread in 1998 reflected that complexity. Attempts to meet security 
concerns both for the regime and for civilians in close relation with the new internationally-
supported president, Joseph Kabila, remained fragile. Artémis, nevertheless, offers an 
arresting point of comparison with the British leading role in Sierra Leone. 
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In Sierra Leone, the progressive firm British leadership undoubtedly originated in a 
particular context in British internal politics, as well as in regard to the UN department for 
peacekeeping operations (DPKO) relationship with the U.S. administration. The newly 
appointed UN chief of peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, started his mandate 
with new confidence and ambition after five years of decline in UN peace activities. He 
would keep this Sierra Leone case in mind during his mandate. Yet, this change primarily 
embodies in how UNSC members conceived the diplomatic leadership on UN peace 
operations, and the practical norms attached to this informal position. This normative change 
concerned the new political costs when UN is visibly militarily humiliated, and the necessary 
firm involvement of the diplomatic leader to avoid such situations. Naturally, in an 
interactionist approach, there is no reason for such normative change to remain indefinitely. 
New political contexts; in the U.S., in the UN, or in African regions in turmoil, may inspire 
new ways of approaching diplomatic leadership within the UNSC. Nonetheless the collective 
caution concerning the credibility of the UNSC supported peacekeeping missions have led to 
a normative change strengthening the leadership role. 
CONCLUSION 
Intense media coverage at the apex of an international crisis and outbreak of large scale 
violence should not restrict the assessment of international action to only the “crisis” moment. 
The everyday political practices that led-up to the crisis need as much attention. 
A focus on the more regular practices from international peacekeeping and security 
managers is all the more relevant when international actors have already liaised with local 
political and military forces, or when targeted states have existing international interventions 
and programs. Crises and outbreaks of violence do often occur in the middle of peacekeeping 
routines, reconstruction programs, or third-party mediation processes. The impact of these 
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interventions, nonetheless, must be assessed from the perspective of both the local actors in 
war-torn areas and to political-military leaders elsewhere. And, of course, the impact of the 
interventions must also encompass what domestic constituencies in the intervening state think 
about them and how intra-organizational politics shape, or are being shaped, by these 
interventions. 
Multilateral conflict management propels different logics of collective 
acknowledgement and legitimization among peers within the UNSC. The leading role 
assumed by a specific UNSC delegation on a specific dossier embodies some of these logics. 
It reflects that fact that multilateral interactions are not necessarily separated from the prior 
bilateral relations between external interveners and local political and military forces. Indeed, 
multilateral operations can often provide resources as to extend a bilateral engagement 
between a UNSC member and a partner state in turmoil. The French lead on Rwanda in 1993-
1994 facilitated UN peacekeeping operations, which compensated for the erosion of 
previously mobilized bilaterally resources. But new resources can also transform the current 
conflict situation in an unexpected way. It may expose current positions of influence within 
the UNSC to rapid transformations at the expense of the holders of these positions. Indeed, 
the French delegation lost its leading position on Great Lakes. The UNSC decision-making 
about Rwanda and its follow-up in Zaire/ DRC, as well as the progressively firm leadership 
assumed by the United Kingdom on the Sierra Leon dossier from 2000, reveal some lessons 
that have been learned since the end of the 1990s by delegations keen to remain in tune with 
their colleagues in the UNSC, and particularly with the U.S. Congress. 
One of the important lessons we learn from the interactionist approach is the 
importance of protecting international peacekeeping operations from being discredited in the 
eyes of local actors, who are tempted to renege on what they previously promised. As well, 
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domestic constituencies of the main backers of peacekeeping operations need to be reassured. 
In the 2000s, the protection of the credibility of peacekeeping operations required that the 
diplomatic leaders, when clearly identified in the UNSC, commit important material and 
political means to avoid highly visible military humiliation and political drawbacks. In these 
critical situations, more than ever, UN peacekeeping operations leaned on the diplomatic 
actors who had supported and led the broader multilateral responses to Africa’s multifaceted 
crises. This obviously applied to the most recent French involvement in Côte d’Ivoire. This is 
not to say that every single UN military response in the 2000s has necessarily been efficient. 
Think of MONUC in DRC or UNAMID in Darfur. But when a diplomatic leadership was 
clearly assumed for a UN mission in the UNSC, it consisted at least in avoiding any military 
humiliation on the ground with large scale media coverage. 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, what we call “lessons” did not stem 
from well defined strategic plans but from practical adjustments entrenched in the day-to-day 
interaction among the UNSC delegations, particularly among the permanent members’ 
diplomats. Disclosing such practical adjustments requires the observation of precise arenas of 
interaction, followed by an inductive reasoning of what was observed.  Deduction of political 
effects and outcomes from overall power positions on a global scale, alone, will offer on an 
incomplete position of how peacekeeping works.  
                                               
i  See Thomas J. Bassett, and Scott Straus, “Defending Democracy in Côte d’Ivoire. Africa Takes a 
Stand”, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 130–140. 
ii  Daniel Bach, “France’s Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Necessary Condition to Middle Power 
Status in the International System”, in Africa and Europe: From Partition to Interdependence or Dependence, 
ed. Amadu Sesay (London: Crom Helm, 1986), 75–85; Maja Bovcon, “France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in 
Côte d'Ivoire and its Ethical Implications”, African Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2009): 1–24; Pierre Lellouche, 
and Dominique Moisi, “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization”, International Security 
3, no. 4 (1979): 108–133; “René Otayek, La Libye face à la France au Tchad: Qui perd gagne ?”, Politique 
29 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Africaine 16 (1984): 66–85; David Yost, “French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge”, Orbis 26, no. 4 
(1983): 965–998. 
iii  In this quest for an in-depth insight on the UNSC, one cannot omit the seminal, anthropological work 
fashioned by Michael Barnett’s on the UNSC everyday work during the genocide in Rwanda. Michael N. 
Barnett, “UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda”, Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 4 (1997): 
551–578; and Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2002). 
iv  With more than 120.000 personnel working for the UN missions on the field (almost 100.000 in 
uniform), and close to 8 billion US dollars. 
v  Adekeye Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin. Africa after the Cold War (London: Hurts & Co., 2010), 59. 
vi  Eric Berman, and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000); Ian Taylor, and Paul Williams (eds.), Africa in International 
Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (London: Routledge, 2004); Mats Berdal, and Spyros 
Economides (eds.), United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
vii  Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace 
Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Paul Diehl, and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace 
Operations (London: Lynne Rienner, 2010); Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
viii  Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Giulia Piccolinon and John Karlsrud, 
"Withering Consent, but Mutual Dependency: UN Peace Operations and African Assertiveness", Conflict, 
Security and Development 11, no. 4 (2011): 447–471; Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoilers Problems in Peace 
Operations”, International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53; Denis M. Tull, and Andreas Mehler, “The Hidden 
Costs of Power Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa”, African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 375–
398; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
ix  Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986); Lena Jayyusi, 
Categorization and the Moral Order (Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1984). 
x  Nicholas G. Onuf, “Constructivism: a User’s Manual”, in International Relations in a Constructed 
World (eds.), Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas G. Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk: Sharpe, 1998), 58–78; James 
March, and Johan Olsen, “Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, International Organization 
52, no. 4 (1998): 943–969; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
xi  Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations 
(Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On 
the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: 
30 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research 
Programme of ‘Critical Security Studies’ ”, Cooperation and Conflict 33, no. 3 (1998): 298–333. 
xii  Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in The Culture of National 
Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153–85; Neta Crawford, 
Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority”, International Organization 53, no. 2 
(1999): 379–408. 
xiii  Peter V. Jakobsen, “The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s. Adding 
Globalization to the Conventional ‘End of the Cold War Explanation’ ”, Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 
(2002): 267-282; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Oliver P. Richmond, “The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding 
Consensus”, Cooperation and Conflict 39, no. 2 (2004): 129–150. 
xiv  Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 
xv  David Chandler, Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto, 2006). 
xvi  Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”; Neta Crawford, Argument 
and Change in World Politics.  
xvii  Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), notably the chapter 5 “The State and the Problem of Corporate Agency”. 
xviii  On these processes of “reflective appraisals”, “mirroring”, “role-taking” and “altercasting”, see 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, chapter 7 “Process and Structural Change”, 326–335 
notably. 
xix  Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (London, New York: Routledge, 2007). 
xx  Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (New York: Penguin Press, 1971); Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990); Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1984); Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay of the Organization of Experience (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
xxi  In his constructivist study on the changing Chinese policy toward arms control after China rallying the 
UN Conference on Disarmament, A. Iain Johnston exemplified how important it was to distinguish the different 
groups of state agents involved and their precise roles in multilateral and internal interactions. Alastair I. 
Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008). 
xxii  According to Anthony Giddens, social contexts and social structures exist as long as they impregnate 
day-to-day practices and are enacted and reproduced through them, in a more or less distant or informal way. 
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. 
31 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
xxiii  Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, The Practice Turn in Contemporary 
Theory (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
xxiv  Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy”, Millennium 31, 
no. 3 (2002): 627-651; Iver B. Neumann, “ ‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for’, or: Why 
Diplomats Never Produce Anything New”, International Political Sociology 1, no. 2 (2007): 183-200; Vincent 
Pouliot, International Security in Practice: the Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Wanda Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations”, 
Millennium 37; no. 2 (2008): 279-301. 
xxv  Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, notably 40–41, 62, 66–67, 80, 108–111; Anthony Giddens, 
Constitution of Society, 84–87; Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality, 43–48. One 
may also usefully refer to the classic Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New 
York: the Free Press, 1991). 
xxvi  For two accounts with different theoretical implications, see Giddens’ account on “practical 
consciousness” (as opposed to the “discursive consciousness”) and Bourdieu’s “logic of practice” founded on the 
concept of “habitus”. Anthony Giddens, Constitution of Society,  notably 3–7, 46–9, 281; Pierre Bourdieu, The 
Logic of Practice, notably 26–27, 48–54, 91–2, 103–104, 297–298. See also Berger and Luckmann, Social 
Construction of Reality, 37–38. 
xxvii  Into the French delegation, some even say “on a le lead” (using the English word). 
xxviii  Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path to Genocide: Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, 
Transaction Press, 1999), 37; Michael N. Barnett, “UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in 
Rwanda”, 572; Andrew Cooper and Ian Taylor, “ ‘Made in Africa’ versus ‘Out of Africa’: Comparing South 
Africa’s Non-Leadership with Canada’s Leadership in the 1996 Crisis in Eastern Zaire”, The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39, no. 1 (2001): 23–41; Bruce Jones, “ ‘Intervention without 
Borders’: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990–94”, Millennium 24, no. 2 (1995): 225-249; Umberto 
Tavolato, “Breaking Colonial Borders: The African Union’s Role in the Southern Sudan’s Secession” [in 
French], Politique Africaine 122 (2011): 101-119. 
xxix  Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 11–13; Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed? The 
United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 
2007), 6. 
xxx  Fen O. Hampson, and Michael Hart, Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and 
the Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 42. 
xxxi  Richard A. Higgott, and Andrew F. Cooper, “Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: 
Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Negotiations”, International Organization 44, no. 4 
(1990): 589–632; Stéphanie Novak, “Decision Rules, Social Norms and the Expression of Disagreement: the 
Case of Qualified-Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union”, Social Science Information 49, no. 1 
(2010): 93. 
32 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
xxxii  Margaret G. Hermann (eds.), Leaders, Groups and Coalitions: Understanding the People and 
Processes in Foreign Policymaking (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
xxxiii  Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990). 
xxxiv  Robert Gilpin, War and change in world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1983). 
xxxv  About this U.S. frequent strategy, see Whitfield, Friends indeed?, 62. 
xxxvi  Adelman and Suhrke, The Path to Genocide, 37; Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics 
of Failure (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 
xxxvii  Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 4; Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After 
Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations”, European Journal of International Relations 
8, no.2 (2002): 267–305 ; Louis Balmond (ed.), Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique (Paris: A. 
Pedone, 1998); Daniel Bourmaud, “La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac : les anciens contre les modernes”, 
Modern and Contemporary France 4 (1996) : 431–442 ; Jean-Paul Ngoupandé, L’Afrique sans la France. 
Histoire d’un divorce consommé (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002). 
xxxviii  France, Assemblée nationale, Pierre Brana and Bernard Cazeneuve, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise, 
Rapport d’information déposé par la Mission d’information de la Commission de la Défense nationale et des 
forces armées et de la Commission des Affaires étrangères sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, 
d’autres pays et l’ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, Paris, n° 1271, December 1998 ; Olivier Lanotte, La 
France au Rwanda (1990-1994) : entre abstention impossible et engagement ambivalent (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2007); OAU (Organisation of African Unity), Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: The Report of the 
International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding 
Events (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Organisation of African Unity, 2000); Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: 
History of a Genocide (London: Hurst, 1997). 
xxxix  France, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise, vol. 1, 299. 
xl  Comfort Ero, “UN Peacekeeping in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire”, in From 
Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations, ed. Adekeye Adebajo (Scottsville: 
University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2009); Jean-Marc Châtaigner, L’ONU dans la crise en Sierra Leone. Les 
méandres d’une négociation (Paris: CEAN/Karthala, 2005). 
xli  Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002); Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2008); David Keen, “Sierra Leone’s War in a Regional Context: Lessons from Interventions”, in 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe, eds. Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (London: Routledge, 2005); Paul 
Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 
1996).   
xlii  Tull and Mehler, “The Hidden Costs of Power Sharing”; Piccolino and Karlsrud, “Withering Consent, 
but Mutual Dependency”. 
33 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
xliii  Barnett, “UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda”. 
xliv  Paul Williams, “Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions: Insights from Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone”, International Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 (2004): 103–123; Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: the 
Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998). 
xlv  Clapham, Africa and the International System; Marine Lefèvre, Le soutien américain à la 
francophonie. Enjeux africains, 1960-1970 (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2010). 
xlvi  Adekeye Adebajo relates the weight of this financial concern from the U.S. during Boutros Boutros-
Ghali mandate (the appointment of the American Joseph Connor as Undersecretary-General for Management in 
1994 was no accident in this regard) then Kofi Annan’s one (and the priority given by the Ghanaian to collect a 
U.S. accumulated debt to the UN of $1.6 billion). Adekeye Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin, 85–86, 92. 
xlvii  Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch and Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, “Leave 
None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Jean-Paul Kimonyo, 
Rwanda, un génocide populaire (Paris: Karthala, 2008); Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 428-473; Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis. 
xlviii Gilbert Khadiagala, “Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda”, in Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens 
(Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002), 87–106. 
xlix  Paul Williams, “Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions”. 
l  Olonisakin F., Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 19. 
li  Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest, 85. 
lii  Peter J. Schraeder, “Removing the Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the 
Cold War”, in Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, eds. 
Ed Keller, and Don Rothschild (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 187-203. 
liii  Roméo Dallaire, and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda 
(Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of 
Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 329-390; OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide; United 
Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda (New York: United Nations, 1999); Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: the Role of the West in 
Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2009). Adekeye Adebajo offers interesting elements about this tragic 
episode for the UN Secretariat, through Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan’s personal experience of it. 
Adekeye Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin, chapter 4 “The Pharaoh and the Prophet: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and 
Kofi Annan”. 
liv  Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil. 
lv  Paolo Tripodi, “When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of 
Deception”, Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 2 (2006): 221–236. 
lvi  Barnett, ‘UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda’. 
34 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
lvii  David Ambrosetti, “Beyond the ‘Norm Entrepreneur’ Model: Rwanda, Darfur, and Social Sanction 
among UN Diplomats”, Global Society 24, no. 2 (2010): 151–171. 
lviii  Châtaigner, L’ONU dans la crise en Sierra Leone, 112-113; Comfort Ero, “British Foreign Policy and 
the Conflict in Sierra Leone”, in Sierra Leone, One Year after Lomé: One-Day Analytical Conference on the 
Peace Process in London, 15 September 2000, ed. O. Oludipe (London: Centre for Democracy and Development 
Planning Series, no. 5, 2000), 110-111; Paul Williams, “La Grande-Bretagne de Tony Blair et l’Afrique”, 
Politique africaine, 94 (2004): 116. 
lix  Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone; Paul Richards, and James Vincent, “Sierra Leone: 
Marginalization of the RUF”, in From Soldiers to Politicians. Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil War, 
ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 81-102. 
lx  United Nations official records S/PV.4577 Resumption 1. 
lxi  United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United 
Nations, 17 July 2000). 
lxii  United Nations official records S/PV.3377.  
lxiii  United Nations official records S/PV.3392. 
lxiv  African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995), 698–711; 
France, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise, vol. 1, 288–289; Jones, “Intervention without Borders”, 231. 
lxv  HRW (Human Rights Watch) / FIDH (Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme), Democratic 
Republic in the Congo: What Kabila is Hinding. Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo. Report, October 1997. 
www.hrw.org/reports97/congo (January 1, 2005). See also René Lemarchand, “Foreign Policy Making in the 
Great Lakes Region”, in African Foreign Policies: Power & process, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Terence 
Lyons (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 87-106; Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and 
Disinformation in the Late 20th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gérard Prunier, From 
Genocide to Continental War: the ‘Congolese’ Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa (London, Hurst 
& Co., 2009); and Peter Schraeder, “Belgium, France, and the United States”, in Security Dynamics in Africa’s 
Great Lakes Region, Boulder, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006), for different accounts. 
lxvi  Interviews with concerned actors and the study of French diplomatic cables dated by November 14, 
1996, support this claim. Some actors told us that the French had to complain as their delegation was not even 
invited in operational meetings preparing the military intervention (that never came). The article “As Mobutu 
Totters, France Ponders Options”, New York Times, April 15, 1997, gives some ex post indications about this 
French diplomatic defeat. 
lxvii  Peter Rosenblum, “Irrational Exuberance: The Clinton Administration in Africa”, Current History 100, 
no. 655 (2002): 195-203. 
lxviii  Resolution #1080 authorizing the operation was adopted on November 15, 1996. In this public 
meeting, the UNSC welcomed at its table 19 delegations other than the UNSC members, and the draft for the 
resolution was eventually sponsored by 33 delegations at end of the session, and adopted unanimously by the 
UNSC. United Nations official records S/PV.3713. See John B. Hay, Conditions of Influence: a Canadian Case 
35 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Study in the Diplomacy of Intervention, Occasional paper n° 19 (Ottawa: Carleton University, The Norman 
Paterson School of International Affairs, 1999). 
lxix  The return of numbers of refugees in Rwanda after their camps having been dismantled by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army in November in front of international media cameras, and the incessant technical 
hesitations and demands from the U.S. delegation towards the Canadian planners of the operation, demobilised 
the diplomatic supports of the operation. Ibid. 
lxx  HRW / FIDH, Democratic Republic in the Congo; Lemarchand, “Foreign Policy Making in the Great 
Lakes Region”; Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda. 
lxxi  Niagalé Bagayoko and Marie V. Gibert, “The Linkage between security, Governance and 
Development: the European Union in Africa”, Journal of Development Studies 45, no. 5 (2009): 789-814. 
